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I. Introduction 
The war in Chechnya has been the symbol of Russia’s disintegration at both national 
and international level. It marked a period in which Russia, a Permanent Member of the 
Security Council of the United Nations and more precisely the military and political 
cornerstone of the former Eastern Bloc, could not even secure the stability and integrity of its 
national borders. Western military experts, academia and human rights activists made various 
proposals with respect to the solution of this internal conflict such as the recognition of 
special regime of significant autonomy for Chechnya, the creation of a system of international 
administration or even the formation of a separate and independent state even by way of a 
military intervention initiated from abroad.1 Of course, time has shown that proposals such as 
the aforementioned proved to be nothing more than empty thoughts or wishful thinking.  
The present paper deals with Second Chechen war from the standpoint of the political 
science. Its main purpose is to analyze its causes, dynamics and termination. The paper is 
structured as follows: First, it offers a brief overview of the main theories applied for 
explaining the emergence of internal conflicts. Then, it deals with the formal outbreak of the 
Second Chechen war and examines whether the Second Chechen war does prima facie 
constitute a civil war. Afterwards the paper examines the main causes that led to this conflict. 
In this respect, factors such as previous wars, fragile institutions as well as activities and 
interests of so-called entrepreneurs of violence are briefly discussed. Hereafter, the paper 
focuses on the financial and organizational opportunities of the Second Chechen war. The 
ideological transformation of the conflict is followed by the analysis of its dynamics and 
termination. In this context, issues concerning its weakening, the course to normality as well 
as the recourse to terrorist methods are to be examined. 
In any case, it should be born in mind from the outset that the present paper faces 
serious limitations. It takes into account only a small proportion of Western literature. Thus, 
its sources constitute a very small part of the, yet, never-ending bulk of international 
bibliography concerning the Second Chechen war. Moreover, although the existing 
bibliography is vast, the primary resources available are restricted and the access to it 
extremely limited since the elapsed time from the very outbreak of the Chechen conflict is 
very short and, hence, it cannot justify the opening of the State Archives from the part of 
Russian Federation. Finally, as the “solutions” referred to in the first paragraph of this paper 
indicate, the Second Chechen war is by its nature inextricably linked both to emotionally and 
politically motivated argumentation. Hence, keeping an impartial perspective appears to be 
more than a challenging task.   
II. Theoretical and Methodological Remarks 
 A common starting point for explaining the emergence of internal conflicts is the so-
called ancient hatreds theory.2 Accordingly, internal conflicts can be easily explained by 
certain historical patterns of violence among different ethnological groups. These hatreds are 
supposed to be temporarily controlled by the dominance of a super-entity such as the 
communistic regime of USSR or the former Yugoslavia.3 Once the super-entity ceases to 
exist, the ancient hatreds are supposed to revive. In case of Chechnya, such a theory would on 
the one hand focus on a perceived eternal war between Chechens and Russians by presenting 
                                                          
1  See, e.g. Russell (2006). 941 et seq., Tremper (2004), 131 et seq. 
2 Brown (1997), 3; Mueller (2000), 44. 
3 Mueller (2000), 44. 
3 
 
the Russian Empire of the 18th and 19th century as a colonizer and the subsequent Soviet 
Union as a perpetrator of a massive deportation of the free spirited mountain nation of 
Chechens.4 On the other hand, the focus might be on a perceived mission of spreading 
civilization and the principles of the organized life to wild mountainous tribes, who, 
furthermore, during the Second World War were willing to fight hand to hand with the of 
axis-powers and especially with the Nazi-Germans.5 Hence, on the basis of that theory the 
emergence of the Chechen-Russian conflict after the collapse of USSR would appear to be 
nothing but natural. 
Obviously, this very “ancient-hatreds” approach to a civil conflict is of a static- as 
well as of a backward-looking nature. It merely sheds light only on one historical dimension 
of a conflict. 6 Moreover, it is mainly based on national narratives which by their very nature 
are supposed to praise the nation in reference. More important, such an approach runs the 
danger of being over-simplistic given the fact that social, political and economic interactions 
are not taken into account.7 Of course, elements of the “ancient hatreds” theory are used in 
cases of civil conflicts or even inter-state wars by the respective elites in order to mobilize the 
respective populations. Yet, such an approach is considered to be a more outdated and a less 
academic one for the study of internal conflicts, since it is also rarely supported by any 
empirical evidence.8 In this context, Brown (1997) critically pointed out that the “ancient 
hatreds” theory is incapable of explaining why violent conflicts have broken out in some 
places but not in others or why some conflicts are more violent to resolve than others.9 
Instead, current research tends to focus more on specific factors/conditions that favor 
the onset of an insurgency or a civil war. According to the seminal work of Fearon/Laitin 
(2003) such factors include i) poverty which characterizes financially and administratively 
weak states and enables recruitment of rebels; ii) political instability and newly formed states; 
iii) rough terrain and large populations; iv) foreign support and, finally v) dependence of the 
state-economy on the export of natural resources such as oil and gas.10 Of course, the 
importance of the domestic elites for the outbreak of an internal conflict should not be 
undermined.11   
Having as a starting point the aforementioned considerations, the present paper is 
going to deal with the second Chechen war by combining elements of the risk theory as 
described in the study of Zürcher (2007) as well as of the Collier-Hoeffler model on civil war 
onsets.  
Risk theory recognizes opportunity as determining factor of rebellion. For example, 
according to Zürcher (2007) there are six main factors that increase society's risk to internal 
conflict such as: i) low level of economic development; ii) state collapse; iii) conflict 
financing; iv) previous wars; v) ethnic geography and vi) mountainous terrain. The Collier-
Hoeffler model considers rebellion as an industry which generates profits. Availability of 
finance is, thus, a critical factor that increases the risk of rebellion. In this respect, the model 
recognizes three main sources for financing a rebellion such as:12 i) extortion of natural 
resources; ii) donations from diasporas; iii) subventions from hostile governments. Then, this 
                                                          
4 Jansen (2010, 91 et seq. 
5 Jansen (2010), 92 et seq. 
6 Brown (1997), 25. 
7 Fearon/Laitin (2003), 76; Brown (1997), 25. 
8 Fearon/Laitin (2003), 75. 
9 Brown (1997), 3. 
10 Fearon/Laitin (2003) 75, 82 et seq. 
11 Brown (1997), 17; Kaufman (1996), 116 et seq. 
12 Collier/Hoeffler/Sambanis (2005), 6 et seq. 
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model deals with the opportunities which reduce the costs for organizing a rebellion. To this 
category belong i) low GDP, low income per capita or status of the secondary schooling of 
males; ii) cheap conflict-specific capital such as weapon stocks and military skills; iii) weak 
government military capacity and, finally, iv) social cohesion, e.g. ethnic and religious 
diversity. It should be underlined, however, from the very outset that there is an overlapping 
among these approaches, since they merely form different prisms through which one can look 
at an internal conflict.  
III. Formal Outbreak of the Second Chechen war 
 The formal outbreak of the Second Chechen war goes back to August 1999 when 
under the leadership of commanders Shamil Basayev and Amir Khatab the Chechen rebels 
invaded the neighboring republic of Dagestan aiming at liberating it and uniting it with 
Chechnya in order to form an Islamist republic.13 The local Dagestani population supported 
by Russian forces resisted and gradually drove the rebel forces back into Chechnya. The 
invasion was followed by a series of bomb explosions in Moscow on 6th and 13th September 
1999 respectively which resulted in 228 deaths. Responsible for these attacks were held to be 
the Chechens although according to the criticism raised by some scholars no proof has been 
shown concerning their involvement.14 In this context, Dannreuther/March (2008) point out 
that these very bomb attacks on apartment blocks had a traumatic impact on Russian 
population similar to that felt by Americans after the attacks of 11 September 2001. For 
Russia, this constituted an ideal strategic moment to react decisively.15 Consequently, the 
Russian army attacked positions within Chechnya including its capital, Grozny, in a combined 
air- and ground operation. Finally, the army entered Chechnya in October 1999 with a great 
military force amounting to 100,000 solders.16 Military experts maintain that the Russian 
response in Chechnya from August 1999 until March 2000 has been in the form of a massive 
conventional military invasion characterized by heavy and unrestricted use of air power and 
firepower to the extent that the force usage would never qualify that conflict as a low intensity 
or a limited war; it rather constituted a conventional full-scale interstate war.17 Be that as it 
may, in 1999 and 2000, Chechnya was the scene of regular armed operations which were 
subsequently replaced by guerrilla warfare.18 
IV. A Civil War ? 
A. Elements of Civil War 
Academic literature does not provide any generally recognized definition of the 
concept of “civil war”. The latter appears to be a rather dynamic concept which cannot be 
easily subsumed under a common global norm. A typical definition of civil war is to be found 
in Small/Singer (1982) and consists of four elements:19 i) military action internal to the 
metropole; ii) the active participation of the national government; iii) effective resistance by 
                                                          
13 Zürcher (2007), 92;  this attack has been characterized as the begin of the fourth phase of the 
Chechen conflict by Dash (2000), 1519. 
14 See, e.g., Zürcher (2007), 92; Tremper (2004), 128. 
15 Dannreuther/March (2008), 99. 
16 Zürcher (2007), 93. 
17  Bakshi, B.G. (2000), 884. 
18 Falkowski (2007), 39 
19 Sambanis (2004), 816. 
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both sides; iv) more than 1000 deaths. Based on this definition, Sambanis (2004) developed a 
very detailed list of the main features of a civil war. Hence, with a certain degree of 
abstraction, a civil war is supposed to fulfill the following elements:20 (1) Territorial: The war 
takes place within the territory of a state that is a member of the international system with a 
population of 500,000 or greater. (2) Political: The parties are politically and militarily 
organized, and they have publicly stated political objectives. (3) Governmental: The 
government (through its military or militias) must be a principal combatant (4) 
Organizational/Local: The main insurgent organization must be locally represented and must 
recruit locally. (5) Body-count/Mutual damage: The start year of the war is the first year that 
the conflict causes at least 500 to 1,000 deaths. Throughout its duration, the conflict must be 
characterized by sustained violence, at least at the minor or intermediate level. There should 
be no 3-year period during which the conflict causes fewer than 500 deaths. Moreover, 
throughout the war, the weaker party must be able to mount effective resistance. Effective 
resistance is measured by at least 100 deaths inflicted on the stronger party.  
In the subsequent part, the aforementioned elements will be applied to the Second 
Chechen war in order to examine whether this conflict can be subsumed under the definition 
developed by Sambanis (2004).  
B. Applying the Elements to the Second Chechen War 
1. Territorial Element: Chechnya is a republic located in the southwest part of Russia. 
In particular it is situated in the northeast region of Caucasus. To the east, north, and west, 
Chechnya borders with Dagestan, Stavropol  Krai, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia, while to the 
southwards it borders with Georgia.21 The capital, Grozny, as well as the other larger 
settlements lie in the middle part of Chechnya, between the mountains in the south and the 
Terek Plains in the north. In this very region, most of the intensive fighting has taken place.22 
The mountainous territory of Chechnya has been used by the rebels as a save retreat as well as 
a lifeline for military supplies.23 Hence, the territorial element is fulfilled because at least at 
the early stages of the Second Chechen war, the conflict took place on a specially identifiable 
territory.  
2. Political Element: In 1991, Chechnya unilaterally declared its independence from 
Russia. Since then, Russia has initiated two wars, in 1994 and 1999 attempting to secure 
control over the secessionist republic. At first glance, both Chechen wars seem to fit perfectly 
to the classical script of nationalist-secessionist war pursuant to the political element.24 In this 
context, it has been pointed out that in the eyes of the European medias the Chechen conflict 
has been presented as “a national struggle for independence, and Chechen fighters were 
usually referred to as rebels.”25 Thus, the political element appears to be fulfilled as well.  
3. Governmental Element: Since the Chechen combatants were primarily targeting 
either the official Russian forces or, later, the pro-Russian Chechen forces and the Russian 
army, primarily, was targeting Chechen combatants this element appears to be fulfilled as 
well. 
4. Organizational/Local Element: The largest and most dominant ethnic group within 
Chechnya was the Chechen one. The fact that ethnic Russians were poorly organized and not 
                                                          
20 Sambanis (2004), 829-830. 
21 Zürcher (2007), 70 et seq. 
22 Zürcher (2007), 70 
23 Zürcher (2007), 71. 
24 Jansen (2010), 100; Falkowski (2007), 41. 
25 Zürcher (2007), 95. 
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mobilized contributed to the speed of Chechen revolt.26 The latter is supposed to have met no 
resistance from the local population. The amount of men in Chechnya who were able and 
willing to fight amounted to 20,000.27 Fighting units were usually based on extended families. 
In fact, the local/organizational element appears to be fulfilled as well.  
5. Body-count/Mutual damage: Due to the lack of data it is very difficult to estimate 
the accurate number of those who fell during the second Chechen war. According to Zürcher 
(2007), during the period 1999-2002 around 4,500 Russian soldiers, 3000 Chechen fighters 
and 13,000 civilians have lost their lives. According to Amnesty International in 2007, up to 
25,000 civilians were killed since 1999, with another 5,000 people missing.28 This great 
amount of human costs is attributed pursuant to Sagramoso (2007) to the perpetuation of a 
spiral of violence.29 Be that as it may, the fact is that the level of casualties appears to be 
extremely high, thus fulfilling the body-count element.30 Apparently, till 2008, there has been 
no 3-year period with less than 500 deaths31 exactly just as the Sambanis (2004) model 
requires. 
Result: At first glance, all elements of Sambanis (2004) theory appear to be fulfilled. 
Therefore, one could argue that, at least the early years of the Second Chechen war, the 
conflict did constitute a “civil war”.   
V. Main Cause: Wars breed Wars, Fragile Institutions and Violence Entrepreneurs 
 The main reason for the occurrence of the Second Chechen war is to be found in the 
period between the end of the First and the beginning of the Second Chechen war, the so-
called interwar period.  
 This period is characterized by increased armed crime and organized kidnapping 
business as well as by competition among warlords for power and for profits respectively. The 
fragile state authority and institutions were dismantled and replaced by alternative criminal 
ones. In fact, the first Chechen war had brought into power so-called entrepreneurs of 
violence, that is warlords who were more interested in the perpetuation of an economy of war 
than in establishing statehood.32 Once the profits from the prolongation of a violence were 
threatened by a system of checks and balances designed to establish polity, they managed 
without difficulty to bypass these structures by resorting to violence.33 
 The First Chechen war ended with the retreat of the Russian forces in 1996.34 
Dzokhar Dudayev, the leader of the Chechen rebels and the first president of Chechnya, died 
in 1996 and was replaced by Aslan Maskhadov, the military commander of the Chechen 
rebels, who won the elections in Chechnya in January 1997. However, he, as a central 
authority, faced the resistance of the field commanders.35 In particular, his attempts to 
incorporate them into the state apparatus and put them under control failed. The same holds 
true for his attempts to co-opt the commanders into the state. Consequently, he also did not 
                                                          
26 Zürcher (2007), 114. 
27 Zürcher (2007), 106. 
28 See 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4179&tx_ttnews[backPid]=1
89&no_cache=1 (last visited 18/11/2012). 
29 Sagramoso (2007), 699 et seq. 
30 Diehl/Karfurke/Kühn/Münch/Tschesche (2008), 18. 
31 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Second_Chechen_War (last visited 18/11/2012).    
32 Zürcher (2007), 112. 
33 Zürcher (2007), 112; Russell (2006), 954. 
34 Zürcher (2007), 81, 112.  
35 Zürcher (2007), 90. 
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succeed in putting under his control the distribution of the material resources, in particular 
revenues from the shadow economy and oil-profits. Once in July 1998 Maskhadov ordered by 
presidential decree the dissolution of all armed groups, the commanders moved into open 
opposition to their president.36 In the fall of 1998, the dismantling of state institutions was 
formally concluded.37  
 All in all, the first Chechen war weakened the existing fragile institutions 
considerably and the entrepreneurs of violence who came into power had no interest in 
statehood and stability. Just before the formal outbreak of the Second Chechen war, 
Chechnya's state of affairs was comparable with that of a failed state.38 
VI. Opportunities  
A. Financing 
 According to the Collier-Hoeffler model, opportunity constitutes a determining factor 
of rebellion. Such an opportunity is present if and only if there are financial resources 
available for rebellion. In this respect, the model focuses on three sources of financing, that is 
extortion of natural resources, donations from diaspora and subventions from hostile 
governments. The following chapter is going to deal with these issues vis-a-vis the Second 
Chechen war as well as with an additional one, namely revenues from shadow economy. In 
fact, shadow economy is supposed to have played a decisive role as regards the organization 
of violence and emergence of the so-called “entrepreneurs of violence”. In this respect, 
Zürcher (2007) vividly points out that the profits "accumulated in the shadow and criminal 
economies proved to be the single most important source of revenues for the various rebel 
movements."39  
1. Extortion of natural resources  
 The republic of Chechnya owns considerable oil reserves. Before the Second World 
War, these oil fields used to be the most productive within the Soviet Union after those in 
Ajerbaijan.40 By the beginning of 1980s the reserves had shrunk whereas in the beginning of 
1990s the production had fallen sharply. While thus according to Zürcher (2007) these 
reserves appear not to have had a strategic significance for Russia in 1990s, they did play an 
important role in the internal struggle for power.41 In fact, it is widely held, that by 1991 
almost one third of the republics budget was covered by revenues stemming from legal as 
well as illegal oil-business.42 
2. Donations from Diaspora and Subventions from Foreign Governments  
 Many foreign Islamic funds and organizations are supposed to have opened offices in 
                                                          
36 Zürcher (2007), 92. 
37 Zürcher (2007), 92, 111. 
38 Zürcher (2007), 86. 
39 Zürcher (2007), 6. 
40 Zürcher (2007), 72. 
41 But see the strong counterarguments in Dash (2000), 1518 et seq. Accordingly, the geoeconomic 
importance of Chechnya is enhanced by the fact that an oil pipeline runs through the heart of the 
country and there is no alternative route. Furthermore, it is considered to be part of a corridor 
leading to the Caspian oil and hydrocarbon wealth. In fact, literature on geoeconomics such as 
Towner (2001) does indeed identify a strong causal relationship between natural resources, 
especially oil, and the Chechen war.  
42 Zürcher (2007), 72. 
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the region of North Caucasus. Among other issues, they supported the construction of new 
mosques, Islamic schools and Islamic literature. Funds such as Al Haramein, the Islamic 
Benevolence Foundation and the Islamic Salvation Organization it is said to have provided 
support to local Islamic groups in Dagestan and in Chechnya.43 Moreover, there have been 
reported large financial flows to Chechnya from states such as the Arab Emirates, Egypt, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.44 In other words, it appears very likely that 
Chechen rebels attracted a fair share of the international funding for jihad, a source of finance 
that is admittedly difficult to block.45 Finally, one should also add that the literature does not 
exclude financial support stemming from other external forces with specific geopolitical 
interest in the region as well as in the weakening of the international position of Russia.46 
3. Criminal Activities and Shadow Economy  
 Several sources of funding are related to criminal activities and shadow economy of 
Chechnya. To begin with, Chechnya provided a safe place for the flush of illegal money from 
Russia and especially from launderers of public funds.47 The same holds true with respect to 
the godfathers of the Chechen mafia. The latter, who were very influential in Moscow, 
laundered their money in Chechnya.48 Furthermore, the Soviet military withdrawal from 
Caucasus, Afghanistan and central Asia left the region with a flood of small weapons and 
ammunition. This led illegal arms trade.49 In addition, consumption goods such as electronics 
and textiles were imported duty free in Grozny and resold for a large profit in Russia.50 
Finally, Chechnya used to provide a safe haven for those who made huge profits from drug- 
and sex trafficking business.51 .  
 To the realm of criminal activities belongs also the ransom business, an activity which 
flourished towards the end of the First Chechen war. Kidnapping and people trading 
developed into a profitable economic activity. Based on figures provided by the Russian 
Ministry of the Interior, between 1992 and 2000 there were 1,815 incidents of kidnapping in 
the North Caucasus.52 Moreover, according to the Russian historical and human rights society 
Memorial around 2,018 people have been kidnapped between 2002 and 2007.53 Pursuant to 
anecdotal evidence the ransom varied according to the rank or the economic basis of the 
hostage. While 10,000 $ and 20,000 $ was the usual price for a Russian soldier and officer 
respectively, the price for rich civilians or western hostages used to be considerably higher.54 
 After all, it appears not surprising that Zürcher (2007) characterized Chechnya as a 
"miracle of the shadow economy and an El Dorado for organized economic crime."55 
B. Organization 
 Apart from “opportunities” of rebellion linked to the issue of financing, there are also 
opportunities dealing with the costs of organizing a rebellion. In other words, the lower the 
                                                          
43 Sagramoso (2007), 694. 
44 Zürcher (2007), 106; Dash (2000), 1520. 
45 Zürcher (2007), 106, 112. 
46 Dash (2000), 1518; Diehl/Karfurke/Kühn/Münch/Tschesche (2008), 16. 
47 Dash (2000), 1520. 
48 Zürcher (2007), 103. 
49 Dash (2000), 1520. 
50 Zürcher (2007), 103. 
51 Dash (2000), 1520. 
52 Zürcher (2007), 105. 
53 Diehl/Karfurke/Kühn/Münch/Tschesche (2008), 18.  
54 Zürcher (2007), 105. 
55 Zürcher (2007), 103. 
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costs of organization the higher the opportunities for rebellion. The Collier-Hoeffler model 
lays down in this respect the four opportunities which reduce the costs for organizing a 
rebellion. Adapting this model to the specificities of the Second Chechen war and aiming at 
avoiding overlappings with issues already discussed, the present chapter will deal with the 
following cost-related issues: i) weapons; ii) recruitment; iii) ethnic dominance and traditional 
Islamic ideology.56 
1. Weapons  
 It has been already pointed out that the Caucasus region and especially Chechnya 
were flooded with weapons due to the Soviet withdrawal from Caucasus and Central Asia, so 
that one could easily buy arms and ammunition even in the central market of Grozny.57 In the 
context of collapse of the Soviet Union, weapons procurement was considered to be by far the 
easiest task.58 
2. Recruitment  
 The availability of large amounts of money for financing the Chechen rebels as 
described in the previous section is a decisive factor that explains the successful recruiting of 
fighters.59 Apart from the economic, one could also add a cultural factor which consists of two 
elements. The first element relates to the so-called extended family. Indeed, over the course of 
time, recruitment became family oriented and fighting units were usually based on extended 
families.60 The second cultural element relates to the established societal values. The 
Chechens are traditionally seen as a martial society, for which fighting is inextricably linked 
to the sense of honor and prestige.61 Moreover, one should also take into account the 
ethnological-demographic factor. Due to the ethnic dominance of the Chechen population, the 
costs of mobilization and recruitment in Chechnya were considerably low.62 Indeed, by the 
time of the outbreak of the first Chechen war, about 73 percent of the population in the 
Republic of Chechnya was ethnic Chechens.63 Hence, from an ethnological perspective, the 
recruitment and mobilization barriers were very low and the revolution could spread very fast 
and with no resistance at all.64  
3. Traditional Islam  
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the traditional Islam entered the public life of 
the Chechen population. But why did this happen? For many, traditional Islam filled the 
moral and spiritual void which had been created as a result of the collapse of the Communist 
ideology.65 Moreover, the spread of traditional Islam as opposed to the originally non-
traditional Islamic values of Chechens, can be partially attributed to the activity of Muslim 
missionaries and funds in the region during the 1990s. Furthermore, the recourse to the 
                                                          
56 A parallel can be drawn here to Sagramoso (2007), 682 who lays down mainly three elements 
facilitating violence, namely the access to weapons technology, the availability of a network of 
training and support, and the spread of attractive ideologies.  
57 Dash (2000), 1520; Zürcher (2007), 103.  
58 Zürcher (2007), 109.  
59 Zürcher (2007), 106.  
60 Zürcher (2007), 76. 
61 Zürcher (2007), 106.  
62 See, in general, Collier/Hoeffler/Sambanis (2005), 7. 
63 Zürcher (2007), 81; Falkowski (2007), 49.  
64 Zürcher (2007), 114. 
65 Sagramoso (2007), 695.  
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traditional Islamic values per se was supposed to constitute an ideological reaction against 
Russia.66 Be that as it may, from the perspective of the economy of civil war, the traditional 
Islam offers a strong element of social cohesion. Hence, by providing a common identity and 
purpose in almost fields of life - social, political, religious - it possesses a great capacity of 
mobilization.67 
 Furthermore, traditional Islam provides for a very attractive system of values to the 
young population. It propagates high social solidarity as well as mutual material support and 
at the same time gives the chance to jump the barrier of seniority and achieve prestige and 
riches while still young.68 Hence, from this perspective, it gives more incentives to the young 
generations to join the rebel army, since it offers an organizational capacity based on elements 
of greed.   
 All in all, by offering a new common identity and a precise socio-political program, 
the traditional Islam limits the costs of recruitment and at the same time increases the 
dimensions recruitment pool since it overcomes the idea of nation. However, although it 
possess a great capacity for mobilization, this very ideology is responsible for the alienation 
of the initial nationalistic-separatist character of the Chechen war and its transformation into a 
military jihad.69 
VII. Ideological Transformation of the Conflict: Swift to Islam  
 It has been already mentioned that the formal outbreak of the Second Chechen was 
triggered by the invasion of Dagestan by the rebels under the leadership of the commanders 
Basayev and Khattab with the aim of uniting it with Chechnya and creating a Islamist 
republic. As the field commander Basayev has noted: 
"What is going on in Dagestan is a mighty “jihad”, a holy war to expel the infidels 
from an Islamic land [...] We are fighting for the proclamation of an Islamic republic 
and the establishment of a greater Chechen empire in Chechnya, Dagestan and later 
also Ingushetia."70  
In fact, it was the reaction of these field commanders that Aslan Maskhadov faced when, as 
early as in 1998, he tried - by ordering a presidential decree - to expel from the region all 
foreigners who formed illegal armed groups and spread religious ideologies.71 The decree was 
directed at Islamic fighters from the Arab world who had established training camps in 
Chechnya such as commander Amir Khattab.72  The fact that Maskhadov did not manage to 
co-opt such field commanders had apart from political also ideological implications. Indeed, 
the ideology of the militants in the case of the Second Chechen war and onwards is based on 
Islamic concepts. In addition to being a struggle for independence, the conflict was 
considered to be mainly a grazvat, a religious war against "infidels" and those who 
"renounced their faith".73 
 The departure from the separatist ideology is vividly described by the Amendment of 
the Chechen constitution which took place in the summer of 2002. Article 1 of the 
constitution was modified by a provision stating that Chechnya is an Islamic state and, 
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moreover, all laws in force in its territory are derived from the Koran and the sunna.74 The 
importance of the Islamic factor is also signified by the fact that the successor of Maskhadov, 
Abdul Sadulaev, had more than often recourse to Islamic rhetoric and quotations from the 
Koran in his decrees and addresses.75 In addition to this, he reformed the separatist 
government by removing those adhered to nationalist ideology and replacing them with 
Islamists and deprived émigré separatist leaders with restricted influence on developments in 
Chechnya.76  
 All in all, the Chechen conflict has undergone a deep ideological transformation. This 
transformation has also effects on the qualification of the conflict. Since the political-
separatist element got replaced by the Islamic-religious one, the conflict has ceased to be a 
civil war pursuant to the definition laid down by Sambanis (2004).    
VIII. Dynamics and Termination 
A. Why is the Conflict Weakening ?  
 During the years 1999 and 2004, the military conflict in Chechnya was very intense, 
although by spring 2001, large-scale military operations came to end.77 From 2004 and on, the 
armed conflict in Chechnya began to attenuate. Since 2006 the conflict has lost much of its 
intensity. By 2009, the war is officially over.78  
 To the weakening of Chechen militants have contributed various factors. Firstly, 
many Chechen commanders, leaders and ideologists died, emigrated or surrendered arms.79 
The most notable examples in this respect is the killing of rebel president Aslan Maskhadov in 
2005 and field commander Shamil Basaev in 2006.80 Secondly, it became increasingly 
difficult to procure weapons and to raise funds to finance the struggle.81 In other words, there 
were less opportunities and greater costs for organizing a rebellion. Thirdly, and consistent 
with the aforementioned factor, the Russian-Georgian and Russian-Azerbaijani borders were 
tightened. Consequently, the rebels lost their bases in the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia, an incident 
which further diminished their strength.82 Another important point is the so-called human 
factor. Chechen people were exhausted by the war and the massive violence and increasingly 
opted for stability and peace.83 Moreover, one could also note that high oil prices and Russia’s 
economic regeneration played an important role since they provided the financial resources 
for reconstruction which were previously not available or were directed elsewhere.84 
However, the most important factor for the weakening of the conflict was the change in the 
Kremlin’s policy towards Chechnya after 2002, that is the launch of the so-called 
Normalization policy.  
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B. Normalization and Conflict Localization 
Under the so-called Normalization policy, the responsibility for the fight against the 
guerrillas and the local administration of the republic was handed over to pro-Russian 
Chechens. In fact, compared to the Russian federal forces, the latter enjoyed the advantage of 
local knowledge and intelligence. Indeed, Lyall (2010) has underlined in this context that the 
operations undertaken only by pro-Russian Chechen forces were by far more efficient than 
the similar Russian-only operations since the former were better positioned to identify 
insurgents within the population.85 The main reason for this is supposed to be that co-ethnicity 
helps attenuate the identification problem, e.g. how to identify the insurgents hiding among 
the local population. The fear factor should also be taken into account. It appears to be more 
likely for individuals to denounce insurgents to solders having the same ethnicity because the 
threat of retribution for withholding information is more credible than the threat issued by 
non-coethnic forces.86 Hence, they were far more effective than the federal troops.87 In this 
context, it has been argued that such a “localization” of the conflict was the only practical 
alternative, since the Russian military lacked sophisticated counter-insurgence capabilities.88 
By 2006, Chechnya was a poor and fragmented society featuring a depressing 
socioeconomic picture with unusually high rates of unemployment and poverty.89 The new  
leader of  Chechnya was the 30-year-old Ramzan Kadyrov, who was appointed prime minister 
in March 2006. The latter is the son of Akhmad Kadyrov, who in the year 2003 was elected  
president  of  Chechnya and in 2004 was assassinated in Grozny.90 Both, father and son, had 
fought against Russia in the First Chechen war but later switched sides.  
 A lot of criticism has been voiced with respect to the policies and the effects of the 
process of Normalization. Human rights  organizations  have  repeatedly  reported  that 
Ramzan’s militia, the so-called kadyrovtsy, was responsible  for  serious  and  routine  human  
rights  abuses.91 Moreover, for many western commentators, the political regime in the 
republic lacked legitimacy since the president is more or less appointed instead of being 
selected through formal democratic procedures.92 In addition, since the conflict had been 
transformed from a Russian-Chechen to an internal Chechen clash, more and more often, the 
militants targeted the pro-Russian Chechen forces.93 The intensity of the internal mutual 
hatred can be illustrated by the common practice of killing the relatives of enemies or taking 
them as hostages, a tactic used by both Chechen sides of the conflict.94 Finally, until the mid-
late 2000s the conflict was supposed to have atomised Chechen society, and to have destroyed 
moral standards as well as social, clan and family bonds.95     
However, nowadays, Russian policies towards Chechnya are supposed to have 
succeeded,96 far more than is generally acknowledged outside Russia.97 Ramzan Kadyrov is 
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proving to be an effective and capable leader with a sufficient sense of strategy. Kadyrov has 
been also fairly efficient in persuading insurgents to switch sides.98 The republic is now 
relatively calm, is being gradually rebuilt,99 it recovers economically and constitutes a loyal 
member of the Russian Federation. Although there were suspicions that behind Ramzan’s 
loyalty there might be a certain amount of hidden separatism,100 Kadyrov is perceived as 
Russia’s most faithful servant in the North Caucasus. Of course, many problems still remain 
in Chechnya. However, the situation has greatly improved over the last few years.101 
C. About Fragile Negotiations, Decisive Victories and the Strengthening of State 
 As such the Chechen war has had a symbolic dimension which reflected the political 
realities within the Russian Federation. It symbolized the period of time when the Russian 
Federation was striving for survival. During the nineties, Russia was a state which could not 
ensure effective control over its territory and its borderlines were put into question. In 
particular, Chechnya reflected the threat of disintegration, the weakening of state structures 
and Russia’s basic inability to stand up for itself and secure its national objectives.102 For 
Russian politics, Chechnya encapsulated two antithetic directions:103 One the one side, it was 
a sort of embarrassment to be disguised by propaganda. On the other side, it reflected a 
recognized failure demanding a concrete action.  
 In 1996 the President of the Russian Federation did negotiate an agreement, the so-
called Accord of Khasavyurt, with the Chechen rebel leaders granting them a de facto 
independence.104 The Russian troops pulled out and the Republic was under the control of the 
field commanders. As such the question concerning the status of Chechnya was postponed for 
a later negotiation in 2001. In the meanwhile, Russia grew stronger.  
In the terms of Luttwak (1999) one could characterize the victory of the Chechen 
forces during the first war only as a temporary one. Indeed, there were no sufficient incentives 
for both belligerents to negotiate a concrete and lasting settlement. Indeed, according to 
Luttwak (1999) “peace takes hold only when the war is truly over”.105 Far more precise 
appears to be in this context Richard Betts (1994). The latter perceives a compromise 
probable if and only if both belligerent sides believe that they have more to lose than to gain 
from fighting.106 He characteristically notes that a “stalemate is likely to yield to negotiated 
compromise only after it lasts so long that a military solution appears hopeless to both 
sides”.107 As regards Chechnya, this was, however, not the case. Pursuant to Betts and 
Luttwaks line of argument, Russia’s dominant priority following the outcome of the First 
Chechen war must have been the preparation for a future war, a war that had to be won. As 
Dannreuther/March (2007) point out, there is no doubt that Vladimir Putin was deeply 
offended by the chaotic state of Russia in the 1990s, of which North Caucasus and in 
particular Chechnya was the most flagrant example.108 
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 Be that as it may, the major argument of Luttwak (1999) refers to the fact that 
conflicts should be left to have their own course of development without any intervention 
from abroad, e.g. international organizations, third states or even NGOs. For Luttwak (1999) 
peace comes only after a decisive victory of the one belligerent party and the defeat including 
the material and psychological exhaustion of the other belligerent party.109 Evaluating the 
Second Chechen conflict from this somewhat cynical point of view, one can see that the 
military victory of the Russian Federation over the rebel forces as well as the post conflict 
situation in Chechenya in general did reflect the characteristics of a decisive victory: To begin 
with, the war was accompanied by a huge number of casualties, a policy heavily criticized in 
the literature.110 Hence, the pool of potential recruitment of rebels was physically shrinking. 
Moreover, the moral of the rebel forces was gradually crushed. Furthermore, the 
normalization policy, which transformed the conflict into an intra-Chechen question, marked 
a victory at the political field of the battle. The subsequent support and cultification of 
Kadyrovs image reflects the victory at the level of political participation and communication. 
Lyall (2010) characteristically stated in this context that given the decisiveness the victory, 
one might easily draw the conclusion that the probability a recurrence of conflict is low.111    
In short: History appears to be going backwards. The stronger Russia became, the 
more capable it was to cope with the rebels and, consequently, the more persistent the peace 
became. 
D. Terrorist Methods 
Apart from the ideological transformation from a separatist war into an Islamic jihad, 
starting from 2002, some militants began to use terrorist methods. In October 2002, about 129 
persons have lost their lives at the Dubrovka theater hostage-taking in Moscow. In the same 
vein, more than 370 persons, mostly children, have lost their lives as a result of the hostage-
taking in Beslan, in North Ossetia. In both cases, the responsibility had been claimed by the 
field commander Shamil Basaev.112  
Since the summer of 2009 there has been a considerable increase in the number of 
terrorist acts committed in Chechnya, ruining the image of the “Normalization” policy.113 In 
November 2009, a bomb attempt on the Moscow-St. Petersburg express took the life of 28 
passengers, some of them Russian state officials. Chechen rebels have claimed that the 
attempt had been instrumentalized by their commander, Dokku Umarov who is the successor 
of  Shamil Basaev. In March 2010, the Moscow metro suicide bombings took the life of 40 
civilians. Again, in February 2011, 37 persons lost their lives as a result of the suicide 
bombings at Domodedovo International Airport. In both cases the responsibility was claimed 
by Dokku Umarov.114  
As early as in 2007, Umarov declared the establishment of a Caucasus emirate 
accompanied by the declaration of war across the region.115 Moreover, he is wanted both by 
Russia and the United States for terrorist attacks, and since 10 March 2011 he has been on the 
United Nations Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee list.116  
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Yet, recourse to such methods brings the conflict outside the territory of Chechnya 
and targets persons that under no circumstances could ever be seen as combatants. Hence, 
terrorist methods constitute a further departure from the definition of “civil war” pursuant to 
Sambanis (2004) and especially from the territorial and the governmental element 
respectively. 
IX. Wrap it Up 
The present survey aims at examining causes, dynamics and termination of the 
Second Chechen War. It begins with a brief analysis of the main theories applied for 
explaining the emergence of internal conflicts and sets as its methodological tools the risk 
theory as described in the study of Zürcher (2007) in conjunction with the Collier-Hoeffler 
model on civil war onsets. The latter considers rebellion as an industry which generates 
profits. Availability of finance is, thus, a critical factor that increases the risk of rebellion 
 At first look, the Second Chechen war appears to fulfill all five elements of Sambanis 
(2004) necessary for the qualification of an internal conflict as a "civil war". Its formal 
outbreak goes back to August 1999 when, under the leadership of commanders Shamil 
Basayev and Amir Khatab, the Chechen rebels invaded the neighboring republic of Dagestan 
aiming at liberating it and uniting it with Chechnya in order to form an Islamist republic. 
However, its main cause can be found in the previous Chechen war which made the already 
fragile institutions weaker and allowed the emergence of entrepreneurs of violence. The latter 
had no special interest in establishing a functional state but rather in the perpetuation of an 
economy of war.  
 On the basis of the Collier-Hoeffler model, the survey shows that the opportunities of 
financing the war were plenty. In particular, there were large revenues stemming from the oil-
business, considerable donations from the international funding of jihad as well as profitable 
criminal activities and a thriving shadow economy. Apart from “opportunities” of rebellion 
linked to the issue of financing, there were also opportunities concerning the low cost of 
organizing a rebellion: In the context of collapse of the Soviet Union, weapons procurement 
was considered to be by far the easiest task. Recruitment was also an easy task due to 
economic, cultural and demographical factors. Finally, the traditional forms of Islam offered a 
new common identity and a precise socio-political program. Hence, traditional Islam limited 
the costs of mobilization and recruitment and at the same time increased the dimensions of the 
recruitment pool.  
 Due to the ideological transformation of the Chechen conflict into a military jihad, 
the Second Chechen war cannot be longer seen as a civil war in terms of Sambanis (2004) 
because the political-separatist element got replaced by the Islamic-religious one.  
 As regards its dynamics, various factors have contributed to the weakening of the 
conflict. Yet, the most important one was the launch of the so-called Normalization policy, 
e.g. the transfer of responsibility and powers to pro-Russian Chechens. Hence, the conflict 
was transformed from a Russo-Chechen into an internal Chechen one. One should refer in this 
context to Lyall (2010) who underlined that the operations undertaken only by pro-Russian 
Chechen forces were by far more efficient than the similar Russian-only operations since the 
former were better positioned to identify insurgents within the population.  
With respect to the termination of the Second Chechen war, one could bear in mind 
the approach of Luttwak (1999) according to which peace comes only after a decisive victory 
of the one belligerent party and the defeat including the material and psychological 
exhaustion of the other. The military victory of the Russian Federation over the rebel forces as 
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well as the post conflict situation in Chechnya in general did reflect the characteristics of a 
decisive victory: The war was accompanied by a huge number of casualties. Hence, the pool 
of potential recruitment of rebels was physically shrinking. Moreover, the moral of the rebel 
forces was gradually crushed. Furthermore, the normalization policy, which transformed the 
conflict into an intra-Chechen question, marked a victory at the political field of the battle. 
The subsequent support and cultification of Kadyrovs image reflects the victory at the level of 
political participation and communication. Lyall (2010) characteristically stated in this 
context that given the decisiveness the victory, one might easily draw the conclusion that the 
probability a recurrence of conflict is low 
In short: History appears to be going backwards. The stronger Russia became, the 
more capable it was to cope with the rebels and, consequently, the more persistent the peace 
became. 
Finally, the conflict experienced another qualitative change due to the extensive use 
of terrorist methods. Recourse to such methods brings the conflict outside the territory of 
Chechnya and targets persons that under no circumstances could ever be seen as combatants. 
Hence, terrorist methods constitute a further departure from the definition of “civil war” 
pursuant to Sambanis (2004) and especially from the territorial and the governmental element 
respectively. Thus, the Second Chechen war could be seen as a typical “civil war” in terms of 
Sambanis (2004) only throughout its early stages. 
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